Recruiting at a Crossroads: The Western World’s Military Talent Crisis
- mamcpherson1
- Aug 18
- 21 min read
In boardrooms, on the frontlines, and behind the doors of defence ministries, a quiet alarm is sounding: the steady erosion of military recruiting across the Western world. What was once a dependable pipeline of talent has become a constricted stream, forcing governments to rethink not only how they attract recruits, but how they define service itself.
Questions have been raised about whether Millennials and Generation Y are less interested in military service, duty, and patriotism than previous generations. Some base their views on personal experience, but it is unclear whether these perceptions reflect reality, myth, or a combination of both.
This article aims to examine perceptions about the decline in military recruiting in the western world and explore potential solutions.
The Evidence Is Mounting
From Washington to London to Canberra, data tells a consistent story:
United States: The Army fell short by over 10,000 enlistments in 2023, the worst deficit in decades.
United Kingdom: Applications to the armed forces have dropped by a third in the past four years.
Australia: The ADF faces persistent shortages in cyber, engineering, and intelligence, all mission‑critical roles.
This is not a single‑country phenomenon. It is systemic.
The Forces Behind the Decline
1. Changing Values and Life Priorities
For Gen Z and emerging Gen Alpha, personal purpose, work‑life balance, and mental health weigh more heavily than traditional calls to duty. Service is no longer automatically perceived as a noble inevitability, it must now compete for meaning.
2. Health and Eligibility Constraints
Physical readiness has become a barrier: obesity rates, mental health diagnoses, and basic fitness shortfalls disqualify many. In the U.S, only around 23% of youth qualify for enlistment without a waiver.
3. Economic Alternatives
With competitive private‑sector pay, hybrid work, and expanding tech opportunities, the military’s traditional value proposition feels less compelling to top candidates.
4. Trust and Institutional Reputation
Scandals, poor veteran outcomes, and politicised conflicts have eroded public confidence. Once‑powerful recruitment narratives now meet healthy, or wary, scepticism.
Strategic Risks on the Horizon
A recruitment shortfall is not simply a human resource headache. It reshapes a nation’s security posture:
Capability gaps in both conventional and emerging warfare domains.
Greater dependence on automation, outsourcing, and allied forces.
Weakened civic‑military ties that reduce societal resilience.
Australian Defence Force (ADF) 2024–25 Recruitment Outcomes
The ADF has faced ongoing recruitment challenges, though a recent short-term increase was noted but remains difficult to assess accurately.
Permanent full‑time enlistments: 7,059, the highest annual intake since 2009–10 ↳ +17% compared to the previous year.
Applications received: 75,000+, a five‑year high and +28% year‑on‑year.
Total permanent/full‑time workforce (as of 1 July 2025): 61,189 personnel, ahead of the targeted growth path for the year.
Retention Trends
ADF‑wide separation rate: 7.9%, well below the 10‑year average, marking a significant improvement from three years ago.
Retention gains are credited to targeted initiatives under the 2024 Defence Workforce Plan, which aims for 69,000 permanent Average Funded Strength by the early 2030s.
Strategic Context
The Australian Government has framed this as the biggest recruitment surge in 15 years, reversing a period of stagnation where the ADF grew by only ~2,000 personnel over a decade.
Verifying this information is difficult because of the ADF's inconsistent procurement and understaffed units. The recent merger of a regular infantry battalion with another to form the 5/7th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, reflects ongoing manpower shortages in the regular infantry regiment.
Growth is being driven by targeted incentives, streamlined recruitment processes, and expanded outreach to under‑represented talent pools.
United States (US) military Recruitment Performance
The US military has had issues attracting and retaining personnel over several years. Below provides a breakdown of the US military recruiting and demographics.
Regular Army (RA): 55,150 recruits — 100.27% of the 55,000 targets.
Army Reserve (AR): 10,669 recruits — 72.8% of the 14,650 targets.
Special Operations Recruiting Battalion: 3,735 recruits — 77% of its 4,851 missions.
Warrant Officers: 1,610 recruits — 99.5% of target.
Medical Mission: 1,376 recruits — 100.7% of target.
Chaplains: 286 recruits — 105.9% of target.
Demographics
Gender: RA 81.9% male / 18.1% female; AR 66.5% male / 33.5% female.
Ethnicity (RA): 40.5% Caucasian, 25.8% African American, 26.1% Hispanic, 6.6% Asian/Pacific Islander, 1.0% Native American.
Ethnicity (AR): 28.8% Caucasian, 28.6% African American, 32.1% Hispanic, 9.9% Asian/Pacific Islander, 0.6% Native American.
Education & Aptitude
High school diploma: RA 94.5%, AR 97.4%.
Some college before enlistment: RA 11.4%, AR 21.4%.
AFQT score above 50: 60.3% for both RA and AR (DoD minimum is 60%).
Bonuses
Regular Army: 24,185 recruits received an average enlistment bonus of $16.9K.
Army Reserve: 6,068 recruits received an average bonus of $15.5K.
Western militaries now offer retention bonuses to attract and keep personnel, reflecting the motivations of the generations they target.
United Kingdom (UK) Recruitment Intake (12 months to March 2025)
The United Kingdom is experiencing greater challenges than the United States and Australia in achieving recruitment objectives. While the societal and cultural factors influencing these difficulties in the UK are multifaceted, they share similarities with those encountered by other Western nations.
Regular Forces total intake: ~13,560 personnel, down around 14% from the previous year.
Army: ~8,050 recruits (largest share, but also the steepest year‑on‑year drop).
Royal Navy/Royal Marines: ~3,050 recruits.
Royal Air Force: ~2,460 recruits.
Reserve Forces intake: ~4,800 personnel, broadly stable compared to 2023–24.
Context & Trends
The UK has seen a 30%+ decline in applications since 2020, with the steepest falls in the Army pipeline.
Vacancy pressure: As of mid‑2025, the UK Armed Forces remain ~4,000 personnel below their combined target strength.
Broader labour market data shows 727,000 total job vacancies across the UK economy in April–June 2025 — the lowest in three years, reflecting a cooling but still competitive hiring environment.
Challenges Identified
Current recruitment, attraction, and retention face major challenges due to both economic cycles and a lack of additional strategies.
Skills shortages: Defence is competing with the private sector for cyber, engineering, and technical trades.
Eligibility constraints: Fitness, medical, and security clearance hurdles continue to limit the candidate pool.
Perception & outreach: Younger demographics show lower awareness of non‑combat career pathways.
Strategic Implications by Nation
The strategic implications of the UK, USA and Australia are complex.
Nation | Strategic Implications | Recommended Levers |
United Kingdom | Persistent vacancy gap (~4,000) risks force readiness and undermines NATO commitments; tech and engineering shortages hamper capability in emerging domains like cyber and ISR. Declining public awareness of diverse career paths weakens the talent pipeline. | Invest in STEM‑targeted outreach; expand lateral entry from industry; reframe non‑combat roles as innovation careers. |
United States | Meeting Regular Army targets masks Reserve & Special Ops shortfalls, which could strain surge capacity. Gender imbalance and under‑performance in some mission categories signal long‑term diversity and capability risks. Heavy reliance on enlistment bonuses is financially unsustainable. | Integrate Reserve and Active recruitment pipelines; diversify force composition; strengthen retention through career‑long education and civilian credentialing. |
Australia (ADF) | Current surge demonstrates potential of incentive‑driven models but sustaining momentum will require deeper cultural alignment with modern career values. Critical skill shortfalls (cyber, engineering) remain a strategic bottleneck. | Broaden talent sourcing to include mid‑career transitions; expand flexible service models; align recruitment narratives with national resilience and humanitarian roles. |
This is not just recruitment data, it is a proxy indicator of national resilience.
All three nations show stress points in skill specialisations, talent diversity, and narrative alignment with younger demographics.
Without intervention, these gaps will compound over the next decade, forcing higher outsourcing, automation reliance, and eroding public trust.
Key Takeaways
Economic pull from a strong civilian job market and better‑perceived conditions is a direct competitor to enlistment.
Cultural shifts mean service must now compete with a broader set of purpose‑driven career options.
Mental health trends both disqualify candidates and shape perceptions of service as psychologically risky.
Eligibility constraints sharply reduce the pool before motivation is even considered.
Perception gaps, especially around non‑combat roles, limit appeal to values‑driven young people.
All five categories converge on a shrinking recruitment pool, which in turn erodes force readiness.
Comparative Recruitment Dashboard
Recent data indicate increases in US and ADF recruitment, while the UK is not currently meeting its targets as shown below.
Metric | UK Armed Forces | U.S. Army | ADF |
Total Intake | ~13,560 (‑14% YoY) | 55,150 RA (100.27% target) | 7,059 (+17% YoY) |
Reserve Intake | ~4,800 (stable) | 10,669 (72.8% target) | N/A |
Applications | N/A | N/A | 75,000+ (+28% YoY) |
Vacancy Gap | ~4,000 below target | Reserve & Special Ops shortfalls | Ahead of target |
Challenges | Skills shortages, perception gaps | Category imbalance, diversity gap | Sustaining momentum, specialist skill gaps |
Strategic Implications Panel
The below panel highlights the key levers of recruitment stress to the UK, USA, and Australia.
Nation | Implications | Key Levers |
UK | Vacancy gap risks NATO commitments: cyber/ISR shortages undermine capability; public unaware of diverse roles. | STEM outreach, lateral industry entry, career reframing. |
US | Regular Army success hides Reserve/Special Ops deficits; bonus reliance unsustainable; diversity gap. | Integrate pipelines, diversify force, accredited education. |
Australia | Surge shows incentives work short‑term; specialist shortages persist. | Mid‑career recruitment, flexible models, humanitarian/resilience narrative. |
Five Intersecting Pressure Points:
Recruitment challenges for the ADF include its transition from a uniformed service to outsourcing through civilian agencies, with long wait times, averaging 300 days, causing many applicants to drop out.
Additionally, medical issues and the stigma attached to mental health events or history further reduce the pool of potential candidates, as such labels can have lasting impacts on young people.
Economic: Civilian careers perceived as higher‑reward, lower‑risk.
Cultural: Declining identification with traditional national service.
Mental Health: Rising anxiety/depression, plus strict entry standards.
Eligibility: Fitness, education, and criminal history filters shrink the pool.
Perception: Low awareness of non‑combat, high‑impact roles.
This is more than a recruitment challenge, it is a barometer of Western resilience. Without bold shifts in narrative, career design, and outreach, today’s gaps will compound, forcing greater reliance on automation, outsourcing, and allied capability at precisely the moment when strategic self‑reliance is most critical.
ADF Recruitment by Decade — Permanent Full‑Time Enlistments
The below timeline from the 1980s to now indicates the higher typical annual intake. This is interesting when noting the smaller population in the 1980s to now as a comparison of service personnel size.
As a member in the 1990s influenced by 1980s recruitment, I observed several changes. Reserve force training shifted from local, short modules to centralised, full-time models, reducing overall Reserve numbers.
Increased operational commitments from the late 1990s to early 2010s expanded regular infantry and special operations units and introduced new integrated reserve service models. During this period, joining the infantry became challenging due to high demand and deployment opportunities.
A shift in ADF recruiting methods and free to air advertising shifted from a 1980s service to the nation model, to a current individualised, gender centric version, such as ‘My Army’, highlighting what benefits and individual reward one would get, rather than notions of sacrifice, service and mateship. It became self-serving and was clearly aimed at the generation at the time.
Decade | Typical Annual Intake | Context & Notable Shifts |
1980s | ~7,000 –8,000 | Cold War posture maintained high intake, strong public service ethos and stable career appeal. Recruitment buoyed by national service legacy (ended 1972) still influencing attitudes. |
1990s | Early 90s: ~6,500 –7,000Late 90s: ~4,500 –5,500 | Post‑Cold War drawdown and efficiency reforms reduced total ADF strength from ~70,000 to ~49,500. Recruiting targets often cut but still missed in late nineties. East Timor (1999) triggered short‑term boost. |
2000s | ~5,000 –6,500 | Operational tempo high (Iraq, Afghanistan, Solomon Islands) but sustained recruiting challenges. Specialist trades (engineering, health, tech) persistently under target. Heavy investment in advertising from 1999–2001 lifted numbers temporarily. |
2010s | ~5,500 –6,500 | Stable but flat intake; separation rates around 9–10%. Modest growth (~+2,000 personnel over decade). Recruitment hampered by eligibility constraints and competition from civilian job market. |
2020s (to 2024–25) | 2020–23: ~5,500 –6,0002024–25: 7,059 (+17% YoY) | COVID‑19 disruptions early in decade; recent surge driven by expanded eligibility (permanent residents, Five Eyes nationals), incentives, and faster processing. Applications hit 75,000+ in 2024–25 (+28% YoY). |
Peak decades: 1980s and early 1990s saw the highest sustained intakes.
Lowest point: Late 1990s post‑downsizing, with some services meeting barely half their targets.
Plateau: 2000s–2010s marked by flat recruitment despite high operational demand.
Turnaround: 2024–25 is the strongest single‑year growth in 15 years but sustaining it will require structural and cultural shifts.
ADF Recruitment Trends: 1980s → 2020s
The following presents comparisons between different decades and generations.
1980s: Sustained high intakes (~7,000–8,000) under Cold War posture.
1990s: Early decade still strong (~6,500–7,000) before late‑90s drawdown (~4,500–5,500) as post‑Cold War reforms bit.
2000s: Flatline around 5,000–6,500 despite high operational tempo in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Pacific.
2010s: Stable but stagnant (~5,500–6,500) with eligibility and competition pressures.
2020s: COVID dip, then 2024–25 surge to 7,059 — highest in 15 years — driven by eligibility expansion, incentives, and faster processing.
Decade | Approx. Full‑Time Strength | Reserve Strength (approx.) | Notable Context / Trends |
1980s | ~69,000–71,000 | ~30,000–35,000 | Cold War posture: end of aircraft carrier era (HMAS Melbourne retired 1982); focus on “defence of Australia” doctrine. |
1990s | ~58,000–60,000 | ~25,000–30,000 | Post–Cold War drawdown; peacekeeping in Cambodia, Somalia, East Timor; 1991 Gulf War deployment. |
2000s | ~51,000–53,000 | ~20,000–25,000 | Operational tempo high: Afghanistan, Iraq, Solomon Islands; recruitment challenges; shift toward joint operations. |
2010s | ~57,000 –59,000 | ~26,000 –28,000 | Capability modernisation (Air Warfare Destroyers, F‑35 program); humanitarian/disaster relief in region; focus on retention. |
2020s | ~57,000 (2023: 57,346) | ~32,000 (2023: 32,049) | Indo‑Pacific strategic competition; AUKUS agreement; emphasis on cyber, space, and high‑tech capabilities. |
Key takeaways
The ADF’s full‑time strength has fluctuated between ~51,000 and ~71,000 over the past 40 years, with the lowest point in the early 2000s.
Reserve numbers have declined since the 1980s but have stabilised or grown slightly in the 2020s.
Strategic posture shifted from continental defence in the 1980s to high‑tempo expeditionary operations in the 2000s, and now toward deterrence and capability uplift in the Indo‑Pacific.
Observations
The Army’s full‑time strength contracted sharply from the 1980s to the 1990s, then stabilised around the mid‑20,000s before modest growth in the 2010s.
Reserve numbers have steadily declined since the 1980s, though the 2020s show a slight uptick.
Strategic posture has shifted from continental defence to sustained expeditionary operations, and now toward deterrence and high‑tech capability integration.
U.S. Military Recruitment: Post‑2021 Decline & Recovery
The US, as one of the largest and most capable militaries in the world, has undergone a radical change in only a brief time.
Year | Active-Duty New Enlistees* | % Change vs. FY 2022 | Policy / Context Notes |
2021 | ~150,000+ | — | COVID‑19 impacts; reduced in‑person recruitment; start of downturn. |
2022 | ~128,000 | 40‑year low | Army missed goal by ~15k; tight labour market; Afghanistan withdrawal effects. |
2023 | ~136,000 | +6% | Waiver reforms: prep courses expand eligible pool. |
2024 | 146,473 | +14% | Biggest YoY rise since early 2000s; all services meet/exceed goals. |
2025* | On track | +~20% | Sustained rebound; Recruitment Task Force in action; triple pay rises in three years. |
*Non‑prior service, all branches combined.
Executive Insights Panel
Turning Point: FY 2022 was a generational low; recovery required structural incentives, not just marketing.
Policy Leverage: Pay adjustments (+4.6% in 2023, +5.2% in 2024, +4.5% in 2025) + 10.5% rise for junior ranks.
Branch Momentum: Army (116% of target), Marine Corps (104%), Navy (101%), Air Force (101%), Space Force (97%).
Strategic Implication: Restored recruitment base supports U.S. readiness posture in Indo‑Pacific and Europe.
Department of Défense data and service‑level updates through mid‑year.
US military recruitment trends 2025
The second Trump administration, with its clear messaging on patriotism, the removal of DEI and focus on America First values has seen a sharp rise in a brief time in the uptake of military recruiting. It has been even more remarkable in the demographic that has traditionally provided the greatest numbers to the US military.
Service (Active Duty) | FY 2025 Goal | Accessions to Date | % of Goal | Notes |
Army | 61,000 | 61,000+ | 100%+ | Goal met four months early — first time since 2021; >10% higher target than FY 2024. |
Navy | 12,160 | 12,751 | 104.9% | Surpassed target by 591 recruits. |
Marine Corps | 4,345 | 4,573 | 105.3% | Strong performance; exceeded goal by 228. |
Air Force | — | — | — | DoD release confirms active components met FYTD goals. |
Space Force | 293 | 295 | 100.7% | Slightly above target. |
Reserve Components (selected highlights)
Army National Guard: 108.8% of goal (14,823 vs. 13,620).
Marine Corps Reserve: 112.4% of goal.
Air Force Reserve: 104.0% of goal.
Army Reserve: 89.1% of goal — the only major shortfall noted.
Key Trends & Drivers
Momentum shift: The Army’s early goal achievement marks a dramatic turnaround from the 2022 low point, with average daily contracts up to 56% higher than last year during peak periods.
Policy levers: Pay rises in three consecutive years (+4.6% in 2023, +5.2% in 2024, +4.5% in 2025, plus 10.5% for junior enlisted) and expanded Future Soldier Preparatory Courses have widened the eligible pool.
Structural factors: A surge in delayed‑entry recruits from 2024 boosted early 2025 numbers, reflecting recruitment outpacing training capacity last year.
Fragility warning: DoD cautions that while metrics are strong, the underlying recruiting environment remains tight, with only ~23% of 17–24‑year‑olds meeting eligibility standards.
Allied Force Recruitment Trends: U.S. vs Australia (2021–2025)
The below table compares the recruitment trends between the US and the ADF from 2021 to 2025.
Year | U.S. New Enlistees | U.S. % Change vs 2022 Low | ADF New Enlistees (approx.) | ADF % Change vs 2021 | Notable Context |
2021 | ~150,000+ | — | ~4,200 | — | COVID disruptions; Afghanistan withdrawal; domestic disaster relief focus in ADF. |
2022 | ~128,000 | Low point | ~3,700 | -12% | U.S.: 40‑yr low; Army shortfall ~15k. ADF: tight labour market; border closures impact recruitment events. |
2023 | ~136,000 | +6% | ~4,000 | +8% | U.S. waiver reforms + prep courses. ADF incentives and STEM recruitment push. |
2024 | 146,473 | +14% | ~4,250 | +6% | U.S. all branches hit/exceed goals; ADF begins cyber/space workforce initiatives. |
2025 (YTD) | Army 61k goal met 4 mo. early; all services 100%+ except Army Reserve (89%) | +~20% | ~4,300 (proj.) | +1% | Pay rises in both nations; heightened Indo‑Pacific readiness focus. |
Executive Insight Highlights
U.S. inflection: FY 2022’s generational low pivoted to FY 2025’s surplus through structural pay reform, expanded preparatory courses, and aggressive recruiter outreach.
ADF steadiness: No dramatic surges, but recruitment has held above post‑pandemic lows with targeted capability pipelines (cyber, space, health).
Allied readiness lens: Parallel pay and capability investment strategies point to convergence in attracting high‑skill talent for great‑power competition scenarios.
Structural & Process Barriers
Excessive recruitment timelines – In 2024, the average time from application to enlistment was around 300 days, causing many strong candidates to drop out for faster‑moving civilian opportunities.
Overly restrictive entry standards – Critics argue the ADF is “too picky” and could safely accept more applicants without compromising capability.
Bureaucratic bottlenecks – Multiple assessment stages, medical checks, and security clearances are often sequential rather than parallel, slowing throughput.
Labour Market & Economic Pressures
Low national unemployment – A tight job market means young Australians have abundant civilian options, often with quicker hiring and onboarding.
Competitive private‑sector pay & conditions – While ADF salaries and benefits are strong on paper, some industries offer higher flexibility, location choice, and lifestyle appeal.
Cost‑of‑living pressures – Even with Defence housing and allowances, postings to high‑cost areas can deter recruits.
Cultural & Perception Challenges
Generational attitudes – Heightened anxiety among young people about long‑term commitments, relocation, and military culture.
Social media influence – Negative veteran experiences and perceptions of post‑service treatment circulate rapidly online, shaping potential recruits’ views.
Awareness gap – Many Australians have limited direct contact with serving members, reducing understanding of career pathways.
Retention Link
Rising resignation rates among junior NCOs and officers — the backbone of training and unit cohesion — create a feedback loop: fewer experienced mentors make it harder to integrate and retain new recruits.
What the data and experts say
Open-source information includes commentary regarding military recruitment as well as perspectives on Millennial and Generation Z demographics.
Factor | Evidence & Insights |
National pride & identity | The RSL’s Defence and National Security Committee has warned that a decline in national pride and a dilution of Australian identity is affecting both recruitment and retention. Surveys like the Scanlon 2023 Social Cohesion Report show falling pride and belonging, alongside lower trust in government. |
Generational attitudes | Studies note that Gen Z tends to have a more circumspect view of “nation and duty” than previous generations. Many consider personal wellbeing, flexibility, and career diversity more heavily than service as a life‑defining commitment. |
Willingness to fight | The 2025 Lowy Institute Poll found only 37% of Australians under 45 said they would fight if the country were attacked, compared with 65% of those over 45. Analysts caution this is not necessarily a “crisis of patriotism” — it may reflect how the ADF’s peacetime deterrence role is explained to the public. |
Perception of service | Social media amplifies negative veteran experiences, and debates over issues like Australia Day can feed into broader questions about national symbols and service. |
Other drivers | Low unemployment, slow recruitment processes, and mental health concerns also deter potential recruits — meaning patriotism is only one piece of the puzzle. |
While some veteran leaders frame the issue as a decline in patriotism, others argue the bigger challenge is relevance and narrative: clearly connecting ADF service to tangible benefits for Australia in both peace and crisis. Without that link, even those who feel proud of the country may not see enlistment as their path to contribute.
The Patriotism Gap: Are Gen Z Willing to Fight?
When headlines warn that “Gen Z won’t fight for their country,” it is tempting to chalk it up to a patriotism gap, a simple story of fading national pride. The reality, though, is more layered: a convergence of economic choice, cultural change, shifting risk perceptions, and, yes, evolving ideas of identity and service.
What the Numbers Say
37% of Australians under 45 told the 2025 Lowy Institute Poll they would fight if the nation were attacked, compared to 65% of those over 45.
The RSL’s Defence and National Security Committee has warned of a dilution of national identity, citing falling pride and belonging in the Scanlon Social Cohesion Report.
Enlistment rates for the ADF remain below strategic targets, even as high‑tech roles in cyber, intelligence, and space are being expanded.
These are not just numbers, they signal a widening perception gap between generations about what “service” means in the 21st century.
Why Gen Z’s Equation Is Different
To address the decline, it is essential to understand Generation Z. This generation has not experienced direct threats to Australia, despite the country's significant involvement in conflicts like Afghanistan and Iraq. These deployments were perceived as 'wars of choice' rather than necessary for national defence.
Driver | Gen Z’s Lens | Strategic Impact |
Career Pathing | Portfolio careers, side hustles, and geographic flexibility trump “one‑uniform” lifetime service. | Defence must pitch modular, skill‑transferable service models. |
Risk & Security | Less connection to past wars; more focus on climate, cyber, and social stability as primary threats. | Messaging must link ADF roles to non‑combat national resilience. |
Institutional Trust | Lower trust in government and institutions; higher value on peer and network validation. | Defence storytelling must prioritise transparency, purpose, and role‑model voices. |
Identity & Values | Broader definitions of community; wariness of nationalist symbolism. | Service narrative should connect to shared civic outcomes rather than only flag‑waving. |
Rethinking the “Patriotism Gap”
The term “patriotism gap” risks oversimplifying a relevance gap. Gen Z are not universally unpatriotic, many express pride in Australia, but they may not see military service as the only or best expression of that pride.
Instead of trying to “rekindle patriotism” in abstract terms, recruitment strategies need to:
Redefine service to include peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, disaster response, and cyber defence.
Shorten recruitment pipelines so candidates are not lost to faster civilian processes.
Highlight transferable skills that power both service careers and post‑service opportunities.
Diversify storytelling, ensuring representation across gender, ethnicity, and career fields.
Increasingly, Gen Z are considered more conservative than those generations before. This is indicative on the great uptake and participation in Australia Day and ANZAC Day events by Gen Z. Both male and female cohorts from Gen Z are increasingly more conservative and likely to feel a sense of patriotism, despite the best efforts of current governments.
Why This Matters for National Resilience
In an era of grey‑zone competition, deterrence, and multi‑domain operations, a force’s credibility depends on both numbers and the public’s willingness to sustain it.
For Australia, bridging this generational perception gap is as much a strategic communications challenge as it is a policy one.
If Gen Z can be shown that serving in the ADF is not about fitting into the past, but about shaping the future, they may bring not only numbers, but the digital fluency, adaptability, and creativity Defence needs.
The “patriotism gap” may be real, but it is bridgeable. It requires meeting Gen Z where they are, not where we wish they were, and connecting their values to our national security needs in language and pathways that resonate.
Source | Key Statistic | Relevance |
2025 Lowy Institute Poll | Only 37% of Australians under 45 said they would fight if the country were attacked, compared with 65% of those over 45. | Direct measure of willingness to defend the nation; shows clear generational divide. |
RSL Defence & National Security Committee (cited in media) | Warned of a decline in national pride and dilution of Australian identity affecting recruitment and retention. | Links cultural identity shifts to ADF recruitment challenges. |
Scanlon 2023 Social Cohesion Report | Recorded falling levels of national pride and belonging, alongside lower trust in government. | Suggests broader social trends influencing service motivation. |
Youth Insight August 2024 Omnibus | 90% of 18–24‑year‑olds enrolled to vote, but only ~38% expressed strong interest in major geopolitical events like the U.S. election. | Shows civic engagement is high, but interest in traditional national security frames is mixed. |
ABC / Monash University analysis | Notes younger Australians are less likely to reach traditional life milestones (home ownership, marriage, children) that historically correlated with more conservative and service‑oriented outlooks. | Indicates structural life‑stage differences that may influence service decisions. |
What this means:
The numbers back up that there is a measurable gap in stated willingness to fight, and that it correlates with broader shifts in identity, trust, and life priorities, not just a single drop in “patriotism.”
Rapid ascent of US military recruitment
Historian and commentator Victor Davis Hanson has been outspoken about what he sees as a recruitment crisis in the U.S. armed forces, tying it to both cultural shifts and leadership decisions. From his recent interviews and columns:
Recruitment shortfalls - Hanson has noted that the Army alone has been short by around 55,000 soldiers, calling it unprecedented in all‑volunteer era.
Demographic alienation - He argues that the steepest declines are in the very demographic that historically endured most of the combat casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan - lower‑ and middle‑class white males from “red states” and that this group has been alienated by recent Pentagon messaging and policies.
Shift in recruitment imagery - Hanson points to a change in Army advertising: “Gone are the commercials of pregnant women in flight suits… now it’s a bunch of guys who look like they’re World War II vets, jumping out of helicopters… ‘Be All You Can Be, Defend Your Country’”- which he interprets as a direct appeal to that “lost constituency”.
Loss of trust - Citing polling, he highlights a sharp drop in public confidence in the military, from 70%+ in 2018 to around 45% in 2021, and links it to events like the chaotic Afghanistan withdrawal, which he calls “the worst U.S. military humiliation since Pearl Harbor”.
Policy critique - Hanson has been critical of what he describes as “woke” recruitment priorities, claiming they focus on niche identity narratives at the expense of broad‑based appeals to service.
Victor Davis Hanson has contrasted the current U.S. military recruiting crisis with what he describes as a period of relative stability, and in some cases growth, during the President Trump administration.
From his public commentary and interviews, Hanson has argued that:
Broader appeal under President Trump - He claims recruitment messaging then leaned heavily on patriotism, mission, and tradition, which resonated with core enlistment demographics.
Retention and readiness - Hanson has suggested that during those years, both recruitment and retention benefited from a perception of strong national defence priorities and fewer high‑profile military embarrassments.
Contrast with later years - He often frames the post‑2020 decline as a reversal, attributing it to politicised messaging, controversial policy shifts, and events like the Afghanistan withdrawal, which he believes eroded trust.
Staggering rise in recruitment – In three months in 2025, the 55,000 shortfalls has been replenished with a record 10,000 joining in one day.
Advertising tone - In his view, Trump‑era recruitment ads were more “warrior ethos” ‑oriented, compared to what he calls the “niche identity” focus that followed, which he argues alienated traditional recruits.
While Hanson does not present detailed year‑by‑year enlistment data in these commentaries, his through‑line is that the cultural and strategic posture of the armed forces under President Trump helped sustain or improve recruitment, especially among the demographics now showing the steepest drop‑off.
Of the 55,000 recruiting shortfalls under President Biden, 90% were white, middle-class males from middle America, many of whom came from families with a history of military service. Other demographic groups remained stable during this period. This period coincided with the implementation of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) policies within the US military.
Rethinking Recruitment for the 21st Century
If Western militaries want to reverse the slide, they need more than new marketing slogans. They need a reframed social contract. In my previous article, The Lost Boys Generation: A Conservative Reflection on Young Men in Crisis, I discuss the generational identity crisis, rooted in the erosion of tradition, responsibility, and masculine virtue.
Conservative views suggest a generational identity crisis stems from declining tradition, leadership, and values. Young men aged 18 to 35 often feel culturally displaced and isolated, as contemporary politics and history challenge traditional ideas of manhood. While military gender demographics vary, men still make up much of the uniformed personnel.
Rebrand Service - Shift perception from “boots on the ground” to “skills for global impact,” highlighting humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, cyber defence, and climate security.
Lead with Integrity and Purpose - Embed values‑based leadership and ethical intelligence as core selling points. Today’s recruits are as motivated by who they serve under as that for which they serve.
Meet Talent Where They Are - Leverage digital platforms, esports communities, and influencer engagement. Gamification and scenario‑based recruitment can bridge the imagination gap.
Guarantee Transition Success - Show recruits the arc from enlistment to post‑service career mobility. Promise, and deliver, transferable skills, respected qualifications, and long‑term support.
The recruiting crisis mirrors deeper societal transformations. For Western nations, the choice is stark: adapt to a new era of service, one that aligns with contemporary values, or watch capability quietly erode. In the end, the solution will not come from nostalgia for past narratives, but from designing a future where national service is again seen as a path to purpose, pride, and impact.
Below are selected quotes from national discourse.
“Declining national pride and a dilution of Australian identity are eroding the ADF’s recruitment base.” — RSL Defence & National Security Committee, cited in multiple outlets.
“You can’t recruit on patriotism when patriotism itself is in retreat among the under‑40s.” — policy analyst quoted in youth advocacy coverage on generational inequality.
“Many young Australians no longer see the flag as a unifying symbol, but as a reminder of a history they feel disconnected from.” — paraphrased from cultural commentary in The Conversation on youth and national symbols.
“Gen Z’s relationship with Australia is more transactional than tribal — they’ll serve if it suits their life plan, not because of a call to arms.” — veteran op‑ed in The Australian
“Younger voters are increasingly sceptical of appeals to national pride, seeing them as political theatre rather than genuine calls to service.” — analysis of youth voting trends in ABC News
“Millennials are less likely than their parents to say they’re proud to be Australian, and even less likely to see military service as a duty.” — summary of findings from the Scanlon Social Cohesion Report.
“They’ve grown up with prosperity and peace but show little appetite to defend either.” - recurring theme in RSL branch commentary reported in regional press.
These quotes reflect public views on the last two generations, though their accuracy is debatable. History shows that perceptions can change; for example, the Silent Generation, once underestimated, earned respect through their actions in the Second World War.
In any Western democracy, the military is more than a war fighting instrument, it is a pillar of national sovereignty, deterrence, and stability. A credible, well-resourced defence force protects a nation’s territorial integrity, safeguards its people and interests abroad, and underpins its ability to act with independence in global affairs. It reassures allies, deters adversaries, and provides essential support in crises ranging from humanitarian disasters to cyberattacks.
Beyond its operational role, the military is a visible embodiment of shared values, rule of law, individual rights, and collective security, signalling both to citizens and the international community that the country is prepared to defend not only its borders, but the principles on which its society is built.
Western nations face significant challenges in attracting volunteers for military service, which have persisted over time. The recent improvements in the United States under the second Trump administration highlight the impact of strong leadership and clear messaging. As global dynamics shift, it remains essential to give current and future generations compelling reasons to pursue a military career or dedicate part of their lives to service.
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